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Whitt: McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n

MCINTYRE V. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N: "A WHOLE NEW
BOUTIQUE OF WONDERFUL FIRST AMENDMENT
LITIGATION OPENS ITS DOORS"1
by

MARK A. WHITT
Please ask for a name to be placed next to the source so I can get mad at the guy who's
doing this. It's strange out there. It's strange.2
President George Bush

I. INTRODUCTION
In Alabama, rogue campaign operatives mount an offensive against a competitor by
mailing anonymous fliers to the opponent's financial contributors.3 In New Orleans, an
aid to a front-running mayoral candidate distributes anonymous fliers alleging that an
opponent has fathered several illegitimate children, is a bisexual, uses drugs, surrounds
himself with drug dealers, and receives kickbacks.4 Anonymous handouts in Los Angeles
describe the leader of a political monitoring group as a "bitter man-hating bitch," while
another member is referred to as a "former poster child for birth control who starts the
day by pouring Jack Daniels over her breakfast."5 In Conejo Valley, California, an
anonymous mailer describes a local council member as a "proven pervert."6 Most states
have laws designed to curb such electoral antics.7 However, a recent United States
Supreme Court ruling calls these laws into serious question on First Amendment
grounds.8
Disclosure statutes are not a modern legislative invention.9 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,10 the Court was asked to determine the validity of such statutes, which
attempt to regulate the dissemination of anonymous political literature. "The most
common explanations given for these statutes are that they deter fraud and libel in the
election arena and that they provide valuable information to the voters."11 In McIntyre,
the Court addressed whether an Ohio statute,12 banning the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature by a private citizen, violates the First Amendment right to free
speech.13 In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment encompasses the
right to publish and distribute anonymous political literature.14
This Note analyzes the Court's decision in McIntyre. Part II defines the issue presented in
the case and provides a general background on disclosure statutes, with particular
attention drawn to the Supreme Court's decision in Talley v. California.15 A brief
discussion of various state court decisions post-Talley is also provided.16 The Statement
of the Case in Part III presents the facts, procedural history and holding of the case.17 Part
IV analyzes the Court's holding.18
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This Note disagrees with the Court's holding for three reasons. First, it argues that the
Court misinterpreted the history of anonymous political speech and engaged in circular
reasoning by assuming that, because the Framers of the Constitution published
anonymously, the Constitution must be meant to protect anonymous speech.19 Second,
the Court should not have subjected Ohio's disclosure statute to the strict scrutiny
standard of review, because the statute at issue does not severely restrict First
Amendment rights.20 Third, assuming arguendo that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review, the Court should have acknowledged that Ohio's disclosure statute
was narrowly tailored to address the compelling state interests of providing the electorate
with relevant information, and identifying those responsible for fraud and libel.21

II. BACKGROUND
McIntyre evidences a clash between competing constitutional principles. On the one hand
is the general acknowledgment of a state's interest in regulating elections.22 On the other
is an individual's right to freely speak and publish on matters of public concern.23
"Balancing"24 these rights became the central concern of the McIntyre Court.
The issue of whether courts should afford anonymous speech a protected status under the
First Amendment was not one of first impression for the Court.25 In Talley v. California,
the Court struck down a Los Angeles City ordinance that placed a wholesale ban on all
forms of anonymous handbilling.26 Supporters of the law cited the government interest in
preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel as sufficient state interests outweighing any
alleged First Amendment claim of individuals.27 However, the Court found the sweeping
language of the ordinance to be overbroad and struck it down as violative of the First
Amendment right to free speech.28
Justice Black, a seminal First Amendment absolutist,29 authored the opinion of the Court.
His opinion provides a historical narrative of anonymous political speech in the United
States, within the context of government abuses against political dissidents. Courts have
cited his strong language in support of a "right to anonymity" repeatedly 30 in similar
cases since Talley. Justice Black stated:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an
important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all. The obnoxious press
licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was
due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of printers,
writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature critical of
the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths
to which government had to go to find out who was responsible for books
that were obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried,
and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get evidence to
convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in
England. Two Puritan ministers, John Perry and John Udal, were
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sentenced to death on charges that they were responsible for writing,
printing, or publishing books. Before the Revolutionary War colonial
patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of
literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were
written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the
Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution,
were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has
sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.31
To the extent that Justice Black's opinion recognized a "right to remain anonymous," the
Court did not fully define the parameters of this new "right." By an express disclaimer,32
the Court left open the question of whether a more narrowly tailored law directed toward
advancing an identifiable state interest might pass constitutional scrutiny.33
Other members of the Talley court were not as enthusiastic about Justice Black's
endorsement of the right to remain anonymous. Justice Harlan, concurring, utilized a
balancing approach and found the scales tipped in favor of free speech because of the
expansiveness of the statute.34 Dissenting Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker,
flatly rejected the majority approach. "I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right
of free speech but not his freedom of anonymity. The Constitution says nothing about
anonymous speech."35
Despite the Talley court's admonition against silencing speech simply because it is
anonymous, most states continued to regulate the dissemination of anonymous political
literature.36 In light of the "disclaimer" in Talley, courts in many states reasoned that
more narrowly defined laws could survive the "exacting scrutiny"37 required of legislative
prohibitions directed at speech on public issues and elections, as opposed to a general ban
on all anonymous literature.38 Other states have been less prone to utilize the Talley
disclaimer and have embraced the broad holding of the case to invalidate disclosure
requirements.39
The federal government also maintains a disclosure statute.40 Unlike many of the broad
statutes found invalid in state courts,41 the federal statute limits disclosure to instances in
which "Any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . ."42 The
limitation of the statute to candidates not issues, referenda, and the like has apparently
been sufficient to sustain the federal disclosure requirement.43
The conflict among jurisdictions in applying Talley to more narrowly drawn statutes
made the issue of anonymous political speech ripe for review. Of course, Margaret
McItyre was likely impervious to this when she mounted her campaign against a school
tax levy.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 29 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 10

A. Facts
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets 44 expressing her opposition to
a proposed school tax levy to persons attending a public meeting at Blendon Middle
School in Westerville, Ohio.45 At this meeting, the superintendent of schools planned to
discuss an upcoming referendum on a school tax levy.46 Mrs. McIntyre produced the
leaflets on her home computer and gave them to a printer to make additional copies.47
They were signed "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers."48 Mrs. McIntyre, her son, and her
son's friend placed the flyers on car windshields in the school parking lot.49
While Mrs. McIntyre distributed her leaflets, an official of the school district informed
her that the unsigned 50 leaflets did not conform to the Ohio elections laws.51 Mrs.
McIntyre appeared at another meeting the next evening and handed out more of the
flyers.52
The tax levy that Mrs. McIntyre campaigned against failed twice, but passed on its third
attempt in November of 1988.53 Five months later, the same school official that had
admonished Mrs. McIntyre about the improprieties of her literature filed a complaint with
the Ohio Elections Commission.54
B. Procedure
At the hearing before the Ohio Elections Commission, Mrs. McIntyre was charged with
violating O.R.C. 3599.09(A),55 which requires any written communication "designed to
promote . . . the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in an
election,"56 be identified with the name and address of the person who "issues, makes, or
is responsible"57 for the communication. The Ohio Elections Commission found Mrs.
McIntyre in violation of the statute and imposed a $100 fine.58
Mrs. McIntyre instituted an appeal of the decision of the Ohio Elections Commission
with the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.59 The common pleas court reversed the
finding of the Elections Commission, holding that O.R.C. § 3599.09(A) was
unconstitutional as applied.60 The State appealed, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals
of Ohio reversed the trial court.61 The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court of Ohio
on a motion to certify the record.62 The Supreme Court of Ohio found the statute
constitutional and upheld the original finding of the Ohio Elections Commission, with
Justice Craig Wright casting the lone dissenting vote.63
The Ohio Supreme Court reached its decision in a bifurcated fashion. First, the court
relied on Anderson v. Celebrezze 64 for the proposition that strict scrutiny does not apply
to regulations governing elections,65 and that O.R.C. 3599.09 imposed only a "minor
requirement"66 on would-be anonymous publishers. Second, the Court determined that
the Ohio statute was more narrowly tailored than the ordinance involved in Talley, and
was thus permissible.67
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Undeterred by the decisions of the Ohio courts, McIntyre petitioned for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.68 The Court granted certiorari, but Mrs.
McIntyre died during the briefing of the case.69
C. Holding
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Majority found the Ohio statute to be in
derogation of the First Amendment.70 First, the Court held that Ohio erred by adopting
the relaxed standard of review set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze.71 Next, in applying
strict scrutiny, the Court determined that providing relevant information to voters was not
sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions imposed by the statute.72 The Court did
find that a state has a compelling interest in preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel,
but concluded that Ohio's disclosure statute was not narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.73 The Majority embroidered its opinion with references to historic figures who
engaged in anonymous political activity, a factor which seemed to weigh heavily in the
Court's reasoning.74
Justice Ginsberg filed a concurring opinion,75 while Justice Thomas filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment.76 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a
spirited dissenting opinion.77

IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in McIntyre failed to take into account several factors that should
have changed the outcome of its decision. First, the Court misinterpreted the "honorable
tradition"78 of anonymous pamphleteering.79 Second, the Court should have subjected the
Ohio statute to the standard of review articulated in Anderson instead of strict scrutiny.80
Third, even assuming that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, Ohio's
compelling interests in maintaining a disclosure statute outweigh the comparatively
minor burdens imposed on free speech rights.81
A. The Anonymous Framers
McIntyre secures the "right to remain anonymous" for those who wish to promote their
views in such a manner, largely due to the Court's analysis of anonymous political
activity carried out during our nation's founding.82 However, the Court did not fully
explore why these authors found it necessary to publish anonymously, nor did it explain
whether any legitimate reasons for anonymity as they existed two centuries ago are still
applicable today.
The McIntyre Court hurriedly embraced Justice Black's famous passage in Talley to
explore the tradition of anonymous pamphleteering.83 From the overall theme of Justice
Black's narrative in Talley, essentially one reason for safeguarding anonymous speech
can be identified.84 Simply, anonymous speech allows persons to speak their mind about
the government without fear of reprisal.85 The Petitioner's argument in McIntyre suggests
that, because some of the Framers published anonymously prior to ratification of the
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Constitution, and other public figures have done so since, one must understand the First
Amendment to prohibit any government restrictions on anonymous speech.86
The Petitioner's argument rests on a false syllogism.87 Petitioners argument is
diagrammed as follows:
Question: Is anonymous political speech constitutionally protected?
Minor Premise: The Framers drafted the Constitution.
Major Premise: The Framers utilized anonymous political speech.
Conclusion: Anonymous speech is constitutional.
However, anonymous writings did not occupy some mystical status during ratification.
"Although the use of pseudonyms was commonplace during the debate that preceded
ratification of the Constitution, it became a 'hotly contested' issue, as Federalist and AntiFederalist editors debated the continuing necessity of this practice and its practical impact
on the character of public debate over ratification."88 This concern led many newspaper
editors to require that authors disclose their identity, out of the concern that anonymous
or secret publication could be used to conceal the authors' true motives when attempting
to influence public opinion."89 The fact that some of the Framers may have engaged in
anonymous political activity does not establish that it is a constitutional right.90
Obviously, the Framers did not enjoy the benefits of First Amendment protection during
the Revolutionary Era, when they spoke out against abuses inflicted by the English
Crown, because the Constitution did not yet exist.91 Passage of the First Amendment
offered some protection, but it did not fully alleviate their concerns. "Development of
national political factions and partisan newspapers during the 1790s provided the
backdrop for fierce debates over the proper limitations on political speech and for more
frequent use of political libel prosecutions."92 It was this fear of widespread political
criticism that led the Federalist to pass the Sedition Act of 1798.93
The chief threat against those that published anonymously during the late 1700s no
longer exists today. First, there is no longer a fear of reprisal by the English Crown or any
other government for that matter. The First Amendment alleviates that concern.94 Second,
modern First Amendment jurisprudence rejects the validity of the Sedition Act the
remaining obstacle to free speech after passage of the First Amendment.95 Finally, the
Majority of the McIntyre Court conspicuously ignored the fact that Mrs. McIntyre never
attempted to remain anonymous, nor did she ever fear retaliation for expressing her
views.96
B. The Standard of Review
The McIntyre Court applied strict scrutiny to Ohio's disclosure statute.97 A more
appropriate standard would have been the test enunciated in Anderson.98 The Anderson
standard is essentially a balancing approach.99 It rejects "Any litmus-paper test that will
separate valid from invalid restrictions,"100 and requires a statute to be narrowly drawn to
advance a compelling interest only when the alleged restriction of First Amendment
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rights are "severe."101 "When a state election law provision imposes only reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state's
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions."102
Under the Anderson test, Ohio's statute would clearly be constitutionally permissible.
Ohio's disclosure statute does not impose a "severe" restriction on speech because
requiring a person to place his or her name on a publication he or she has authored does
not "severely restrict" the ability to publish. It only requires that the speaker identify
himself on the communication.103 Although the disclosure statute regulates the form of
the message in limited circumstances,104 it does not regulate its substance. Thus, the
restriction is reasonable and non-discriminatory.
The Court rejected the Anderson test, however, reasoning that Ohio's disclosure
regulation does more than control the mechanics of the voting process.105 The Court
viewed the disclosure requirement as a content-based regulation of political speech
subject to strict scrutiny,106 because "Only those publications containing speech designed
to influence voters in an election need bear the required markings."107
C. The Court Ignored Ohio's Compelling State Interests
Even when subjected to strict scrutiny, the Court should have upheld Ohio's disclosure
statute. The regulation of the electoral process is a compelling state interest.108 When this
interest is balanced against the minimal intrusion on First Amendment rights occasioned
by a mandatory disclosure statute, the state interest outweighs any asserted right to
anonymous speech.109 Moreover, the disclosure statute has a "rational basis" because it is
causally related to the advancement of compelling state interests.110 Disclosure ensures
that the electorate receives only relevant information and, without it, there is no way to
identify those who engage in fraud, false authority, and libel. There are no less intrusive
means available for the state to advance its interests in an adequate manner.111
1. Providing the Electorate With Relevant Information
The Court summarily dismissed Ohio's interests in providing the electorate with relevant
information as a compelling interest justifying disclosure.112 This holding seems to
conflict with the Court's precedent with respect to disclosure requirements in other
contexts.113
The goal of providing the electorate with relevant information is to promote rational
electoral outcomes.114 Rational government is a necessary - precondition for the
attainment and preservation of any right. "To place freedom of speech above the
rationality of government itself is to ignore the fact that only through intelligent selfgovernment are any freedoms, including freedom of speech, secured."115
There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence concerning the absurdity of anonymous smear
campaigns, which disclosure statutes seek to regulate.116 Scholars, journalists, and even
politicians have long lamented over the "cheapening" of modern elections.117 Their
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discontent is evidenced by the dearth of legislation designed to combat "gutter
politics."118 "Such a universal and long established American legislative practice must be
given precedence, I think, over historical and academic speculation regarding a restriction
that assuredly does not go to the heart of free speech."119
2. Identifying Persons Who Engage in False Advertising and Libel
The McIntyre Court agreed that Ohio had a compelling state interest in preventing fraud
and libel.120 Nonetheless, the Court determined that Ohio's disclosure statute was not
narrowly tailored to effectuate its purpose, because legitimate activities fall within the
prohibitions outlined in the statute.121 However, the Court goes on to state: "We
recognize that a State's enforce ment interest might justify a more limited identification
requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafleting at issue here."122
The Court's holding produces a troubling result. On the one hand, the Court recognizes
that a state has a compelling interest in preventing fraud, false advertising and libel.123
This interest having been established, a state should be permitted to promulgate
legislation in furtherance of that interest.124 The McIntyre decision prevents a state from
doing so. These laws are meant to be complementary, and to prohibit operation of the
former undermines the latter.125 Persons who are libeled thus have no recourse against the
perpetrators because there is no way of identifying them.

V. CONCLUSION
The McIntyre Court was presented with the issue of whether it is constitutionally
permissible for a state to prohibit the anonymous communication of political speech
within the context of a statute governing elections. The Court should have applied the
standard of review articulated in Anderson and its progeny to uphold Ohio's disclosure
statute as a reasonable means of addressing a compelling state interest. Moreover, the
method chosen to effectuate those interests the disclosure statute only minimally affects
free speech rights.126 Instead, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found no compelling
state interest to justify such a "severe restriction" on speech.127
Even when strict scrutiny is applied to Ohio's disclosure statute, compelling state interests
are served by mandatory disclosure. 128 First, the state has a compelling interest in
providing the electorate with relevant information about candidates and issues.129 This
serves the legitimate end of promoting rational electoral outcomes. Second, the State has
an interest in preventing fraud and libel, and should have a means of identifying
perpetrators.130 Otherwise, enforcement of prohibitions against disseminating false or
mislead ing information is ineffective.
The parameters of the "right to remain anonymous" will only be ascertained by continued
litigation in this field.131 Fortunately, the life tenure of Supreme Court Justices assures
that at least they will never be on the receiving end of negative, anonymous election
tactics.
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1. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1535 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
2. John E. Yang, Anonymous Sources Come Home to Roost, WASH. POST., Mar. 13,
1992, at A-23. An exasperated President Bush made this plea during a news conference,
where he chastised the media's practice of quoting anonymous sources.
3. Kevin Sullivan, Kid Gloves Come Off in Montgomery, WASH. POST., Mar. 25, 1994, at
C1.
4. Kenneth J. Cooper, Negative Themes Dominate Contest in New Orleans, WASH. POST.
, Feb. 5, 1994, at A8.
5. Barry M. Horstman, Flyer Uses Vulgarity to Attack GOP Group , L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1992, at Metro 6.
6 T.W. McGarry, Schaefer, Stratton Gail Leads in Local Races, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1986, at Metro 6.
7. See Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First
Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 145 n.8 (1995) (listing the disclosure statutes of
48 states); but see infra note 35 (noting disagreement about the exact number of states
that continue to maintain disclosure statutes). Distinguishing and classifying the
disclosure statutes of various states is not addressed in this Note. For such distinction, see
King, supra.
8. The First Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("The freedom of speech and of the press,
which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.").
9. Ohio adopted its first disclosure statute in 1915. Act of May 27, 1915, 1915 Ohio Leg.
Acts 350. See State v. Babst, 135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922) (disclosure statute upheld as
neutral and regulatory). By the end of World War I, 24 states had similar laws. See
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1533 n.1 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of disclosure statutes written on the eve of McIntyre, see
King, supra note 7. King's Comment outlines the disparity among state courts in
resolving the issue presented in this Note. For specific cases discussing disclosure
statutes, see John C. Williams, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute
Prohibiting Anonymous Political Advertising, 4 A.L.R.4th 741. See also infra notes 3839.
10. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). McIntyre is yet another watershed case in First Amendment
jurisprudence originating from Ohio. See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(Cincinnati, Ohio); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Canton, Ohio).
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11. King, supra note 7, at 144.
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988) (statute reproduced infra
note 55) amended and renumbered by 1995 Ohio Legis. 60 (H.B.99) (renumbered as
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.20).
13. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of people peaceably to assemble . . . ." US
CONST. amend. I.
14. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516-17.
15. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II, notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part III (A), (B) and (C).
18. See infra Part IV (A), (B) and (C).
19. See infra Part IV (A).
20. See infra Part IV (B).
21. See infra Part IV (C) (1) and (2).
22. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989) (states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of the
elections process).
23. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression . . . .").
24. "Balancing" the rights of individuals against the asserted interests of states is a
common feature of first amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 373 (1927) ("[A]lthough the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental,
they are not in their nature absolute."), overruled by, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) ("[A]lthough . . . absolute."). However, First Amendment purists, such as Justice
Black, have rejected any notion of "balancing" First Amendment rights against an
asserted state interest:
As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that
[balancing] doctrine for I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal
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command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the
'balancing' that was to be done in this field.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See
also MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO
BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 90-209 (1984) (discussing
Justice Black's judicial philosophy); Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
865 (1960). Justice Black's philosophy with regard to the First Amendment has never
been widely held by other members of the Court. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, An
Absolutism that Works: Reviving the Original "Clear and Present Danger" Test, 1983 S.
Ill. U. L.J. 127 (1983) (discussing Justice Black's philosophy concerning the First
Amendment as a minority viewpoint).
25. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (discussed infra notes 26-35 and
accompanying text).
26. Id. (statute "at issue" was not limited to political advertising, but covered all written
communications).
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Insco,
365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del.
1974); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La.
1976); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978) (each case
involving a challenge to disclosure requirements on campaign literature).
31. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64, 65 (citations and footnotes omitted). For similar impassioned
views, see People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("Anonymity
has been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory
power of the establishment and, whether their fears of reprisal were justified or not,
encouraging them to express unpopular views. Anonymous writings have an honored
place in our political heritage."); North Dakota Educ. Ass'n , 262 N.W.2d at 735 ("It is
worth remembering that among the glories of our nation's history are documents written
under pseudonyms by men who were to become the second, third and fourth Presidents,
the first Chief Justice and the first Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State of the
United States.").
32. State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tenn. 1982) (upholding Tennessee disclosure
statute based upon the "express disclaimer" of the Talley Court). See infra note 33.
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33. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64 ("Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a
way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance
is in no manner so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative history indicating
such a purpose. Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to
prevent these or any other supposed evils.") (emphasis added). Courts that have upheld
disclosure statutes in the wake of Talley have cited this passage as a means of
distinguishing their "narrow" statutes with the "broad" one at issue in Talley. See infra
note 38.
One might be left puzzled as to why Justice Black did not seize upon the opportunity in
Talley to invalidate all disclosure laws regardless of any asserted state interest based
upon his literal interpretation of the First Amendment's language that "Congress shall
make no law. . . ." See supra note 24. Might Justice Black have been worried that without
the "disclaimer," he would not be able to command a majority to sign on to his opinion?
For a discussion of interpersonal relationships of justices and the "politics" of the
Supreme Court, see CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-8,
155-68 (1992).
34. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also supra
note 26 (ordinance encompassed all types of speech, political or otherwise).
35. Id. at 70 (Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
36. The exact number of states with disclosure statutes is somewhat disputed. One article
places the figure at 43 states. Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1111, 1286-92 (1975). Another author recently placed the figure at 48. King, supra note
7, at n.8 (listing the citations to disclosure statutes in 48 states). Still another author
asserts that only fourteen states maintain disclosure statutes. Steven Robert Daniels,
Survey of Developments in North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit, 1993, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 1618, 1624 (1994). The source of confusion probably arises from the fact that
disclosure statutes vary widely in their scope and application. See King, supra note 7, at
146-50 (categorizing disclosure statutes based on four criteria: (1) The type of writing
regulated; (2) The type of disclosure required; (3) Whether disclosure is linked to the
writing itself or to an expenditure disclosure; or (4) Determining who is made criminally
liable for failing to disclose the publisher or disseminator.)
37. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) ("When a law
burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction
only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest."). But see infra notes
99-107 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court should only apply strict scrutiny
when first amendment rights are severely restricted, or where a governmental prohibition
directed at speech is content-based and discriminates as to the views of the speaker, i.e.,
the restriction is not viewpoint-neutral).
38. See, e.g. United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Messerli v.
State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 12 Cal. Rptr.
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2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), superceded by, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, aff'd, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
659, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794; Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1976);
State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1993); State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn.
1982). In each of these cases, the courts concluded that the disclosure statutes under
review were drawn sufficiently narrow in furtherance of compelling governmental
interests, as opposed to the broad ordinance involved in Talley.
39. See, e.g., Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (mandatory disclosure of identity of person or
organization responsible for production of campaign literature violates First
Amendment); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974) (proposed statute
requiring mandatory disclosure of author's name in newspaper editorial would violate
First Amendment); State v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195, 200 (Idaho 1968) (disclosure statute
found void for vagueness); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987) (mandatory
disclosure violates First Amendment); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976)
(declaring unconstitutional a disclosure statute requiring political literature to bear the
name of its author); accord State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989); Commonwealth
v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975) (distributing anonymous circulars protected by
First Amendment); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978);
People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (disclosure statute
unconstitutionally limits free speech).
40. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1988).
41. See supra note 38.
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1988).
43. See United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1973). ("The
ordinance [in Talley] was a broad one barring distribution of any handbills in any place,
under any circumstances, without an attribution statement. Section 612, on the other
hand, applies only to statements relating to or concerning a candidate . . . . That statute is
therefore limited in its coverage to requiring fairness in federal elections and does not
preclude anonymous criticism of oppressive practices and laws as referred to by the
majority in Talley . . . ."). The Court's reference to § 612 is the predecessor statute to 2
U.S.C. § 441d (1988).
44. A photocopy of one of Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets is reproduced at McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1514 n.2. The main text of the flyer reads in
substantially the same form as below:
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new buildings
and expansion programs. We gave them what they asked. We knew there
was [sic] crowded conditions and new growth in the district.
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit - WHY?
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We are told the three middle schools must be split because of overcrowding, and yet we are told 3 schools are being closed - WHY?
A magnet school is not a full [sic] operating school, but a specials [sic]
school.
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help
formulate the new boundaries. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard and
came up with a very workable plan. Their plan was totally disregarded WHY?
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education
and welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE
TOLERATED.
PLEASE VOTE NO
ISSUE 19
THANK YOU
CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS
45. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. The April 27th meeting marked the beginning of a long
and unpleasant battle over the tax levy in Westerville. See Hansen v. Westerville City
Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), cert. denied
115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). Mrs. McIntyre and several other individuals subsequently formed
a group called "Citizens Against Tax Waste" (CATW). Id. At a public meeting over the
tax levy in September, 1988, the local police ejected one of the members of this
organization for commandeering the meeting. Id. At a meeting in October, the police
ejected another member of CATW and charged him with resisting arrest. Id. At the same
meeting, police forcibly escorted several other individuals from the meeting. Id. Twelve
members of CATW, including Mrs. McIntyre, eventually sued the school board and the
police in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The only claims to survive
summary judgment were those alleging that CATW members were impermissibly barred
from public meetings at the school. Id.
46. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
47. Id.
48. This was a fictitious organization. See Brief of Respondent at 1, McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (No. 93-986) [hereinafter "Brief for
Respondent"] See also supra note 45 (reference to "Citizens Against Tax Waste").
49. 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
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50. Some of the leaflets were in fact signed by Mrs. McIntyre. Apparently, Mrs. McIntyre
intended to sign all of the flyers but failed to do so. See Brief for Respondent, supra note
48, at 1.
51. 115 S. Ct. at 1514. See also infra note 55 (text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)).
52. 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
53. Id. See also supra note 45 (describing the feud over the tax levy).
54. 115 S. Ct. at 1544.
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988) provides:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement,
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed
to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate or to
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in
any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of financing political
communications through newspapers, magazines, outdoor advertising
facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of general public political
advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed
matter, unless there appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous
place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the
organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible therefor. The disclaimer 'paid political advertisement' is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of this division. When such publication
is issued by the regularly constituted central or executive committee of a
political party, organized as provided in Chapter 3517 of the Revised
Code, it shall be sufficiently identified if it bears the name of the
committee and its chairman or treasurer. No person, firm, or corporation
shall print or reproduce any notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample
ballot, or any other form of publication in violation of this section. This
section does not apply to the transmittal of personal correspondence that is
not reproduced by machine for general distribution.
The secretary of state may, by rule, exempt, from the requirements of this
division, printed matter and certain other kinds of printed communications
such as campaign buttons, balloons, pencils, or like items, the size or
nature of which makes it unreasonable to add an identification or
disclaimer. The disclaimer or identification, when paid for by a campaign
committee, shall be identified by the words 'paid for by' followed by the
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name and address of the campaign committee and the appropriate officer
of the committee, identified by name and title.
O.R.C. 3599.09 was amended and re-codified at O.R.C. 3517.20. See LEXIS, OH-LEGIS
60 (H.B. 99)(eff. Aug. 22, 1995). The revised statute limits the attribution statement to
candidates, campaign committees, legislative campaign funds, or other entities. Id.
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).
57. Id.
58. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. Mrs. McIntyre was not beaten or pilloried as was John
Lilburn in the example cited by Justice Black in Talley v. California. See supra note 31
and accompanying text (explaining the fate of John Lilburn for distributing prohibited
books). The Ohio Elections Commission could have taken one of any of the following
courses of action: (1) Imposed a fine of up to $1,000; (2) Reported its findings to the
appropriate prosecuting authority for civil or criminal prosecution; or (3) Entered a
finding that good cause has been shown not to impose a fine or refer the matter to the
prosecuting authority. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(C)(1-3) (Anderson 1988).
The Court did not mention subsection (C)(3) in its opinion. This provision provides a
"safety valve" that should have been sufficient to uphold the statute in its general
application. See infra note 105 (explaining that the Court has allowed special exemptions
from other types of disclosure laws for certain groups, without invalidating the law in its
general application).
59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951,
aff'd, 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
60. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152, rev'd 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
61. McIntyre, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951.
62. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152, rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
63. Id. at 156 (Wright, J., dissenting). Justice Wright stated:
[I] do not agree with the majority that R.C. 3599.09(A) imposes a 'minor
requirement' that 'persons producing campaign literature identify
themselves as the source therefor,' nor do I agree that this requirement
'neither impacts the content of their message nor significantly burdens
their ability to have it disseminated.' I am sure that Publius and Cato
would have strenuously disagreed with the majority as well.
Id.
64. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See also infra note 99 (explaining the Anderson test).
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65. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154-55, (citing Byrdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992)).
("[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation
be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of
states seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.").
66. Id. at 155. ("The minor requirement imposed by R.C. 3599.09 that those persons
producing campaign literature identify themselves as the source thereof neither impacts
the content of their message nor significantly burdens their ability to have it
disseminated."). This reasoning is also relevant to the issue of whether the statute was
content based. See infra notes 104-5.
67. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154 ("In contrast to the ordinance in Talley, [Ohio] can
legitimately claim that R.C. 3599.09 has as its purpose the identification of persons who
distribute materials containing false statements . . . . Accordingly, unlike Talley, the
disclosure requirement is clearly meant to 'identify those responsible for fraud, false
advertising and libel.'").
68. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 1047, motion to dismiss denied, 114
S. Ct. 2670 (1994).
69. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2670, 2670 (1994).
70. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516-24 (1995). Perhaps this is
to state the matter too tactfully. The last line of the Court's opinion paraphrases Ohio's
disclosure statute as follows: "One would be hard pressed to think of a better example of
the pitfalls of Ohio's blunderbuss approach than the facts of the case before us." Id. at
1524. Has "Nino" finally rubbed off on the Majority? See Stuart Taylor Jr., Season of
Snarling Justices, AKRON BEACON J., Apr. 5, 1990, at A11 (describing Justice Scalia's
confrontational style with other justices of the Court). See also Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even Justice Scalia's allies have not escaped his wrath.
See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (chastising Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy for not
explicitly overruling Roe v. Wade).
71. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 ("[T]his case 'involves a limitation on political
expression subject to exacting scrutiny.'" (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420
(1988)). "[T]he category of speech regulated by the Ohio statute occupies the core of the
protection afforded by the First Amendment." Id.
72. Id. at 1520 ("The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant
information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in the case of a handbill written by a
private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author adds
little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.").
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73. See id. at 1520-21. The Court stated:
Ohio's prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal
weapon against fraud. Rather, it serves as an aid to enforcement of the
specific prohibitions and as a deterrent to the making of false statements
by unscrupulous prevaricators. Although these ancillary benefits are
assuredly legitimate, we are not persuaded that they justify 3599.09(A)'s
extremely broad prohibition.
74. See id. at 1524 ("Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.").
"Great works of literature have frequently been produced by authors writing under
assumed names." Id. at 1516; but see id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I can imagine
no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an
anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter."). See also id. at 1516 n.4, 1517 n.6.
Footnote 4 lists well-known historical figures who published anonymously, such as Mark
Twain, O. Henry, Voltaire, Benjamin Franklin, George Eliot, George Sand, Charles
Dickens, and William Shakespeare. Footnote 6 lists prominent Federalist and AntiFederalists who published under pseudonyms, including James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, and John Jay ("Publius"), and others whose true identities are still subject to
speculation, such as "Cato," "Centinel," "The Federal Farmer," "Brutus," and "Junius."
The Court also cited Justice Black's historical analysis of anonymous political activity in
Talley v. California. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (Justice Black's defense of
anonymous speech).
75. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995). Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion notes that, "We do not hereby hold that the State may not
in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest by, disclosing its
identity." Id. Just what these other, larger circumstances might be is anyone's guess. As
journalist David Broder notes, "The Court deliberately left in doubt whether the same
ruling would apply if 10,000 or 1 million letters were mailed anonymously on the eve of
a national election . . . ." David S. Broder, Bungled by the High Court, WASH. POST,
May 7, 1995, at 7. Although the federal counterpart to Ohio's disclosure statute, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441d, might be upheld because of its limitation to candidates, Broder's question
remains valid because the effect of the Court's ruling on the federal statute was not
addressed in the Court's opinion. This is a glaring omission, especially since the subject
of the federal disclosure statute did arise during the course of oral argument. See Official
Transcript, available at WESTLAW 1994 WL 665265.
The Second Circuit recently had occasion to review the federal disclosure requirement in
the wake of McIntyre. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285
(2d Cir. 1995). Here, the defendants were charged under 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) for failing
to identify their organization in a solicitation letter for donations to be used for political
causes. Id. at 287. The court upheld the statute as a minimally restrictive method of
ensuring open electoral competition. Id. at 296. The court reached this conclusion by
distinguishing McIntyre, holding that the regulation of solicitations for campaign
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donations is a compelling government interest capable of withstanding strict scrutiny. Id.
The interests were said to be "more compelling" and the statute "more narrowly tailored."
Id. at 295.
76. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1525. Justice Thomas criticized the Majority's reasoning for
"Fail[ing] to seek the original understanding of the First Amendment." Id. at 1530. Justice
Thomas went to great lengths in hypothesizing such understanding, and came to the
conclusion that the "historical evidence from the framing" supports the conclusion that
the Framers understood anonymous pamphleteering to be protected speech. See id. at
1525-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1530 ("The Court discovers a hitherto unknown right-to-be-unknown while
engaging in electoral politics."). Ironically, Justice Scalia also based his conclusion on
ascertaining the "original intent" of the Framers. The fact that he and Justice Thomas
came to opposite conclusions while employing an original intent analysis plays nicely
into the hands of critics of the "original intent" school. For further discussion of "original
intent" analysis, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d Ed. (1988); and Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204 (1980). The foremost advocate of original
intent theory, former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, answers critics in ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
78. See supra note 74.
79. See supra note 74, and infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 74.
83. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516-17 (1995) (citing relevant
portions of Justice Black's analysis of anonymous political speech).
84. Cf. infra note 31 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Brief for Petitioner, at 12-15, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511
(1995) (No. 93-986). See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 30-41.
87. A syllogism is the full logical form of a single argument. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1449 (6th ed. 1990). "It consists of three propositions (two premises and
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the conclusion), and these contain three terms, of which the two occurring in the
conclusion are brought together in the premises by being referred to a common class." Id.
The syllogism necessarily fails because the constitution did not yet exist when the
framers engaged in anonymous speech. This is not to say that one can reach the opposite
conclusion from this syllogism. Rather, it demonstrates that the argument begs the
question rather than answers it. This argument also fails to consider that many of the
same legislators who ratified the First Amendment also passed the Sedition Act a short
time later. See infra note 95.
88. Brief for Respondent at 30, 31 (citing SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS.
ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (Forthcoming,
1995)).
89. See Editors, B. IIDEP. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1787, reprinted in XIII The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 315 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1981), cited in Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 31 ("[I]t is
submitted to you, gentlemen, and the other Printers in the State, whether it will be best to
publish any production, where the author chooses to remain concealed."). See also MASS.
CENTINEL, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra at 315-16, cited
in Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 32 (requirement of newspaper that all writers
be willing to identify themselves publicly).
90. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1531 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
91. Hostilities with England for the most part ceased after the Yorktown campaign in
1781, and peace with England was formally resolved in 1783. The U.S. Constitution was
ratified in 1788. Two years later the first ten Amendments were adopted. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1991).
92. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 71 (1986).
93. See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS ch. 2 (1985) [hereinafter
LEVY, A FREE PRESS]. See also LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
Levy's earlier work argued that the early American experience with regard to press and
speech liberties was marked by widespread intolerance by the government. Levy admits
in his later work that he previously overstated his case. He explains that if one looks at
American practices instead of American law and theory, there exists not a legacy of
suppression but a "legacy of liberty." Levy, A Free Press, supra, at ch. 10. See also
LOUIS FISHER, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ch.
618-20 (1990).
94. See Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Ky. 1976) ("[I]t does not seem
altogether naive to assume that a fundamental objective of the First Amendment was to
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obviate the necessity for anonymity. Not only is it unnecessary in the conduct of public
elections, it is repulsive."). See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 40 A.2d 137, 138-39 (PA.
1944) ("[The disclosure statute] is an attempt to raise the ethical standards of political
discussion, to promote fair play and fair competition in politics, to banish cowards from
the political arena . . . .").
95. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the Sedition Act
was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court
of history."). In fact, the Sedition Act expired under its own terms in 1801. 1 Stat. 596 §
2. President Jefferson thereafter pardoned every person convicted under the Act. FISHER,
supra note 93, at 620. There is general agreement that the Act was a significant factor in
leading to the downfall of the Federalist party. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 93; LEVY,
FREE PRESS, supra note 93; Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious
Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985) (an excellent overview
of the law and theory of seditious libel from the sixteenth to early twentieth century).
96. "The record in this case contains not even a hint that Mrs. McIntyre feared 'threats,
harassment, or reprisals'; indeed, she placed her name on some of her fliers and meant to
place it on all of them." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1511, 1535
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Mrs. McIntyre thus sought to vindicate a right she never
attempted to exercise in the first place. See also supra note 45 (Mrs. McIntyre was a
prominent figure in the tax levy battle who had little reservation about making her
presence known.).
97. See supra note 71 (strict scrutiny applied to Ohio's disclosure statute).
98. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See infra note 99 (discussing the
Anderson test).
99. A court considering a state election law challenge must weigh "the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against the precise interests put forward by the State as
justification for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." Anderson, 460
U.S. at 789. Strict scrutiny also involves "balancing," but the scales are presumptively
tipped against the state. "[I]t is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives
strict scrutiny." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). With strict scrutiny, a state
must demonstrate a "compelling" interest and show that its law affecting a fundamental
right is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984). The lesser Anderson standard is more akin to intermediate scrutiny, and presumes
that the restriction are valid: "[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only
reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
'the state's important [not compelling] regulatory interests are generally sufficient of
justify' the restrictions." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ohio
1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (emphasis and
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brackets added)). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46 (1987) (discussing various classes of speech and standards of review with
regard to the First Amendment).
100. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
101. Burdick v. Tukashi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("[A]s we have recognized when
those rights are subjected to 'severe restrictions', the regulation must be narrowly drawn
to advance a State interest of compelling importance."). In Burdick, the Court considered
a challenge to Hawaii's prohibition against write-in voting. Id. at 430. The Court applied
the relaxed Anderson standard of review and held that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in
voting did not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens' rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 432-42. This was despite the Court's prior
acknowledgment that "[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under out
constitutional structure." Id. at 433 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). Although Hawaii effectively eliminated this form of
political expression, the Court did not view this as a "severe restriction." Id. at 437. See
also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding statute providing for "campaign
free zone" within 100 feet of a voting booth on election day).
102. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. See also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (1992) ("Common
sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an
active role in structuring elections."); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("[A]s a
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.").
103. The Petitioner argued that governments have used laws requiring compulsory
disclosure to subject members of unpopular groups to intimidation, threats, and
harassment from adversaries. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), the Court held that compelled disclosure of NAACP membership lists
violated those persons' rights to freely associate and disseminate their views. Similar
issues arose in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (both cases involving disclosure laws used as a pretext for racial
discrimination). The rule to be learned from these cases is that laws, which are otherwise
constitutional on their face, cannot be enforced in such a manner as to violate individuals'
constitutional rights. It follows, then, that courts can carve exceptions to disclosure laws
for persons who demonstrate specific facts indicating that disclosure of their identities
will subject them to harm. Cf. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87 (1982) (plaintiff exempted from complying with Ohio election statute requiring
disclosure of campaign contributors because of the history of harassment against Socialist
party members); Patterson, 357 U.S. 449. The Court could have acknowledged this
safety mechanism and upheld O.R.C. § 3599.09 in its general application. In fact, such a
"safety mechanism" is built into O.R.C. § 3599.09. See supra note 57 (statutory provision
allowing elections commission to enter a finding that "good cause" exists to forgo the
imposition of a fine or punishment for violation of the disclosure requirement).
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104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(a) (Anderson 1988). The disclosure statute
only applies in instances where the speaker seeks to affect the outcome of a candidate or
issue-based election. Id. It does not require an attribution statement to appear on all types
of communication. For example, anonymous leaflets circulated in protest of a
government policy, or directed directly against a government official or officeholder,
would not be prohibited by the statute. In fact, it would be perfectly permissible to wage
an anonymous campaign against the disclosure statute itself.
105. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 ("[E]ven though this provision applies evenhandedly to
advocates of differing viewpoints, it is a direct regulation on the content of speech.").
106. Id. The great weight of authority supports the Court's proposition that the statute in
McIntyre is "content-based," because the statute regulates a certain topic of speech, i.e.
political speech in support of or in opposition to a candidate or issue. See infra notes 3839, 43 (strict scrutiny applied to disclosure statutes, including those states that have
upheld the statutes). However, this Note argues that a court reviewing a disclosure statute
should apply a two-pronged test. First, the court should determine whether the statute is
content-based. If so, the next inquiry should be to determine whether the restriction is
viewpoint neutral. Arguably, all disclosure statutes will be content-based by their very
nature because of the activity they seek to regulate (speech concerning a political topic).
However, if the disclosure statute is viewpoint neutral, the statute should not be subject to
strict scrutiny. This test shifts the inquiry to whether the challenged restriction burdens a
persons ability to publicize his or her views, which should be the primary concern of the
First Amendment. Attribution statements contained in a writing do not impede the ability
to publish, nor do they censor the substantive content of the message. See infra note 105
(arguing that the disclosure statute is viewpoint-neutral), and 107 (discussing the
limitations of the disclosure statute with respect to the class of speech regulated).
The test advocated above bridges the gap between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions in cases such as McIntrye, where the classification to be given to the speech is
not entirely clear. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (questioning the content-based/content-neutral distinction and elaborating on
the parameters of content-based restrictions). For example, Stone defines "contentneutral" restrictions as those "[L]imit[ing] expression without regard to the content or
communicative impact of the message conveyed." Stone, supra note 98, at 48. "Contentbased" restrictions "[L]imit communication because of the message it conveys." Id. at 47.
Examples of a content-based restriction include laws that prohibit seditious libel or ban
the communication of confidential information. Id. Content-neutral restrictions might
include laws that restrict noisy speech near a hospital, or laws that limit campaign
contributions. Id. at 48. The speech at issue in McIntyre is not easily pigeonholed into
either category. Ohio's disclosure statute operates irrespective of whether the information
to be anonymously conveyed is true or false, so in that respect it is content-neutral. See
infra notes 105, 107. On the other hand, the only speech regulated by the statute is that
which one communicates in support of or in opposition to a candidate or issue, so in this
respect it is content-based. The two-pronged test outlined above gives effect to the
general concern of whether speech on an entire topic is encumbered, as well as the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 29 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 10

specific concern of whether an alleged restriction censors the content of a speaker's
message.
107. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518. A content-based restriction on speech occurs where
restrictions are placed on the espousal of a particular viewpoint, or when there is a
prohibition of public discourse on an entire topic. Burson, 504 U.S. at 191. See also Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principle inquiry in
determining content-neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys . . . . Government regulation
of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.'"). Ohio's disclosure statute is viewpoint neutral: it does
not discriminate as to the subject matter of the speech nor the topic of the speaker, nor
does it censor the speaker's message. See also Stone, supra note 99 (identifying seven
distinct standards of review the Supreme Court has used in resolving content-neutral
restrictions on speech).
108. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of the
elections process). See also supra notes 101-02 (cases upholding restrictions on speech in
order to preserve the integrity of the elections process).
109. It is conceded that attempting to "balance" competing rights is a perilous enterprise,
because the relative weight to be given to an asserted right is incapable of quantification.
See generally Stone, supra note 99, at 72 (discussing the inherent difficulty of utilizing a
balancing approach to claims of Fist Amendment abridgment). The competing interests at
issue with regard to disclosure statutes are the state's interest in maintaining the integrity
of elections versus an individual's (asserted) right to disseminate anonymous political
literature. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing the tension between
these interests). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the long acknowledged
right of states regarding elections regulation outweighs the right to anonymous speech,
especially since a major tenant of the First Amendment was to obviate the need for
anonymity. See supra note 94, and infra note 116 (questioning the need to protect
anonymous speech in light of the protections afforded by the First Amendment).
It should also be noted that a majority of states have chosen to enact disclosure statutes.
See supra notes 9, 36. This provides additional evidence that the interest being protected
by the statutes is in fact compelling. Cf. Burson , 504 U.S. at 191 (citing the fact that all
50 states have laws similar to the one being challenged as evidence that the interests
advanced by the state are compelling).
110. That disclosure statutes are related to the advancement of the state interest to be
protected is not disputed. What is disputed is whether disclosure statutes are sufficiently
tailored to advance the state's interest, without infringing on other protected rights. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text (Court's overbreadth analysis).
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A state should also be able to enact a disclosure statute without demonstrating that it has
experienced problems of voter fraud or misinformation campaigns in the past. Cf. Munro
v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). In Munro, the Court upheld a
Washington statute requiring minor candidates to obtain 1% of all votes cast for that
office in the state's primary election before the candidates name could appear on the
general ballot. Id. at 190-99. The basis for the law stemmed from Washington's fear of
"voter confusion and ballot overcrowding." Id. at 194. However, Washington never
demonstrated that these fears had in fact materialized. The Court upheld the statute
nonetheless. "Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential
deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that
the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally
protected rights." Id. at 195-96.
111. Theoretically, a state could adopt a disclosure statute that only requires an
attribution statement where the content of the message is false, misleading, or libelous.
See King, supra note 7. However, the prevention of fraud, false advertising, and libel are
not the only interests at issue; the state also has an interest in ensuring that the electorate
has access to relevant information in order to make informed decisions. See infra notes
113-14 and accompanying text (arguing that the informational interest served by the
disclosure statute is "compelling"). A disclosure requirement directly serves this interest.
Moreover, Ohio's disclosure statute is an aid to enforcement of a related statute that
prohibits the dissemination of knowingly false information. Without the disclosure
statute, enforcement of the statute prohibiting false statements would be difficult, if not
impossible. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1511, 1536 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting ) (explaining why a prohibition against making false statements is meaningless
without a corresponding enforcement mechanism).
112. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520 ("Ohio's informational interest is plainly insufficient to
support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement."). Accord People v. White, 506
N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987) (rejecting the argument that ensuring an informed electorate is a
sufficient interest to support a disclosure statute). But see infra note 101-02 (discussing
cases recognizing an informational interest with respect to elections laws).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding disclosure
requirement for lobbyists as imposing only a modest burden on First Amendment rights
without regulating the content of the speech). Moreover, the modest burdens are
outweighed by the state interest in "maintain[ing] the integrity of a basic governmental
process." Id.; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978)
("Corporate advertising . . . is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the source of
advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that people will be able to
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (upholding portions of the Federal Elections Campaign Act mandating
disclosure of campaign contributors). The McIntyre Court distinguished Buckley and
Belotti on the basis that neither dealt with the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522-23.
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In Burson, 504 U.S. at 211, the Court upheld a Tennessee statute prohibiting the
distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of any voting booth on election day.
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the ban based on Tennessee's compelling
interest in "[P]rotecting voters from confusion and undue influence." Id. at 14. This raises
an interesting question: Had Mrs. McIntrye been in Tennessee and distributed her
anonymous flyers within 100 feet of a voting booth, would her speech have lost its
protected status? For cases contra to the proposition that the First Amendment should
serve an informational interest, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)
(First Amendment protection is not dependent on the "truth, popularity, or social utility of
the ideas and beliefs which are offered."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)
("The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority for assuming
a guardianship of the public mind. . . . [T]he forefathers did not trust any government to
separate the true from the false for us."); accord Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419
(1988) (citing Thomas and Button).
114. See generally James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral
Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 892
(1984) ("A central though rarely articulated premise of many election laws and much
democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be rational rather than irrational that
they should reflect the true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people."). Cf. Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). "[I]t has been recognized that a State has a
compelling interest in ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by
fraud in the election process." Id. at 200-05 (discussing the problems associated with
elections fraud since the inception of the paper ballot in American electoral politics).
115. Gardner, supra note 114, at 936.
116. See supra notes 3-6. See also Canon v. Justice Ct., 393 P.2d 428, 459 (Cal. 1964)
("[A]nonymity all too often lends itself, in the context of attacks upon candidates in the
preelection period, to smears, as a result of which the electorate is deceived.
Identification permits confrontation and often makes refutation easier and more effective.
It tends to reduce irresponsibility. It enables the public to appraise the source."). See also
infra note 117 (comments regarding "gutter politics").
117. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21
CAP. U. L. REV. 575, 575-78 (1992) (discussing negative political advertising during
1988 presidential elections); Lance Conn, Comment, Mississippi Mudslinging: The
Search for Truth in Political Advertising, 63 MISS. L.J. 507, pts. II-III (1994) (discussing
the problems of negative political advertising in Mississippi, but arguing that state
regulation of such speech would run afoul of the First Amendment); Peter F. May, Note,
State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive
Negative Attacks, 72 B. U. L. REV. 179, 181-91, (1992) (explaining the widespread use
of negative political advertising in Massachusetts); David S. Broder, Politicians, Advisers
Agonize Over Negative Campaigning; Success of Tactics Discourages Policing, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 1989, at A1 (discussing negative campaigning and how politicians and
political advisors view it as a "necessary evil"); Bill Kirtz, How to Handle Negative Ads ,
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BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 9, 1992, available at WESTLAW 1992 WL 3391959
(recommending that television networks "recap" false political advertisements to alleviate
voter confusion: "Displace false content and hold the bums accountable."); Alexandra
Marks, Backlash Grows Against Negative Political Ads, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Sept. 28, 1995 (general overview of public sentiment against negative advertising, with
related commentary on why such advertising is effective); Matt Truell, House Advances
Ethics Bill, ASSOC. PRESS POLITICAL SERV., Mar. 24, 1993, available at WESTLAW
1993 WL 5587563 (quoting Kansas state congressman Tom Sawyer, D-Wichita, as
stating "Our campaigns have continually gotten dirtier, and the public has gotten tired of
dirty campaigns."). See also supra notes 94, 116 (anonymity used as a shield by those
wishing to take advantage of the electoral process), and 36 (explaining that a majority of
states have some type of disclosure statute in order to maintain the integrity of the
elections process).
118. See, e.g., supra note 36 (discussing the fact that most states have some type of
disclosure statute). See also Gardner, supra note 114 (discussing the need for rational
election outcomes); supra note 117 (discontent with modern election tactics).
119. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1533 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also supra note 109 (arguing that the widespread use of disclosure
statutes is indicative of the compelling interest served by regulation of anonymous
campaign literature, which should assist a disclosure statute in meeting the strict scrutiny
standard of review).
120. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-21.
121. Id. at 1520 ("As this case demonstrates, the prohibition encompasses documents that
are not even arguably false or misleading."). This critique might be more persuasive were
it not for Ohio's related interest in providing the electorate with relevant information.
This interest, though related to the issue of false and misleading information, is a separate
and distinct issue. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining the importance
of ensuring that voters have access to relevant information).
122. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522. But see supra note 111 (arguing that a more limited
disclosure requirement would not be effective in identifying those persons who engage in
activity legitimately prohibited by the state, i.e. fraud, false advertising, and libel).
123. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
124 See infra notes 101-02, 108 (cases explaining the importance of regulating the
elections process).
125. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 11, 12 (arguing that the disclosure
statute is a necessary aid to enforcement of the prohibition against making knowingly
false statements). See also infra note 111 (explaining that a prohibition against making
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false statements is useless without an enforcement mechanism such as a disclosure
statute).
126. See infra Part IV (B).
127. Id.
128. See Part IV (C).
129. See Part IV (C)(1).
130. See Part IV (C)(2).
131. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285 (2d. Cir. 1995).
See also supra note 75 (discussing the holding of this case and the rationale used to
distinguish it from McIntyre). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at
1511, 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] whole new boutique of wonderful First
Amendment litigation opens its doors.").
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